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Abstract In this paper, I explore several versions of the bundle theory and the
substratum theory and compare them, with the surprising result that it seems to be true
that they are equivalent (in a sense of ‘equivalent’ to be specified). In order to see
whether this is correct or not, I go through several steps: first, I examine different
versions of the bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the substratum theory
with tropes by going through various standard objections and arguing for a tu quoque in
all cases. Emphasizing the theoretical role of the substratum and of the relation of
compresence, I defend the claim that these views are equivalent for all theoretical
purposes. I then examine two different versions of the bundle theory with universals, and
show that one of them is, here again, equivalent to the substratum theory with universals,
by examining how both views face the famous objection from Identity of Indiscernibles
in a completely parallel way. It is only the second, quite extreme and puzzling, version of
the bundle theory with universals that is not equivalent to any other view; and the
diagnosis of why this is so will show just how unpalatable the view is. Similarly, only a
not-so-palatable version of the substratum theory is genuinely different from the other
views; and here again it’s precisely what makes it different that makes it less appealing.
Keywords Bundles  Substrata  Substratum  Bundle theory  Substratum theory 
Metaphysical equivalence  Identity of indiscernibles
1 The substratum theory and the bundle theory: deadly enemies
The substratum theory (also called ‘the substance-attribute view’) can be put as a
claim about what the relationship between a particular and its properties is: there are
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particulars and there are their properties that are exemplified, instantiated, or had by the
particulars who are conceived of as being the bearers of those properties. Such a bearer of
properties, which has its identity independently of the properties which it bears, is often
called ‘‘an underlying subject’’, a ‘‘substratum’’, or a ‘‘bare particular’’. An object like a
table or a person is thus made out of two different kinds of components: properties and a
substratum that supports them and glues them together in order to make up an object.
In contrast, the bundle theory denies the existence and the need for a substratum:
as fundamental components of reality, there are only properties. Take my neighbour
Cyrano: he is of a certain age, he has a big nose, he has such and such a height, and
so on. And this is all there is to know, and all there is to be Cyrano—his properties.
On this view, an object is then taken to be a bundle (a cluster, a bunch, ...) of its
properties. There is no need and no room in the bundle theory for two kinds of
components to make up objects, rather, they are just bundles of properties which are
the ultimate constituents of reality, and which are held together (glued together in
order to make up an object) by a special property (an n-adic relation, where n is the
number of properties of the object) often called ‘‘compresence’’ (following Russell,
who meant by this label something like ‘‘simultaneous presence’’; however, when
speaking here about the bundle theory and while keeping the term ‘‘compresence’’ it
is not only and not specifically Russell’s view that I will have in mind).
2 The compresence relation
Depending on how one conceives of the compresence relation (the ‘bundling’ relation)
and of the nature of properties, the bundle theory comes in different versions:
      compresence 
one and the same 
numerically 
identical relation 
for all objects 
one and the same 
numerically 
identical variably 
polyadic relation 
for all objects 
distinct relations 
(one per object) 
with properties 
as universals 
with properties 
as tropes 
bundle 
theory 
453
1a 1b 2
The numbers in this table simply indicate in what order I will examine these
different views; the really interesting ones being 2, 4 and 5. What about the
substratum theory? Is there also such a table to be drawn? Not really: of course, the
substratum theory comes in different versions depending on whether properties are
conceived of as tropes or universals, but there are not different possibilities for the
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substratum as there are for the compresence relation—the substratum is, by
definition, numerically different in different particular objects.
(1a) and (1b) are not really available options. First, simply because tropes, unlike
universals, cannot multiply occur in different objects and so it is not possible here
that one and the same compresence relation does its bundling work in different
objects. Second, (1a) is unavailable for another obvious reason: not all objects have
the same number of properties, and so something like a variably polyadic relation
(like ‘‘x, y, z, ... are compresent with one another’’) is required. (This will also be
true for (3).).
3 Twin brothers?
The only really interesting position for the bundle theory with tropes with respect to
the compresence relation is (2). Let me now compare this view, BTT (Bundle
Theory with Tropes) to its alleged opponent STT (Substratum Theory with Tropes).
To make up objects out of properties, BTT uses a bundling relation that goes
around under different names like ‘‘compresence’’ (the term that I will be using),
‘‘consubstatiation’’, ‘‘co-instatiation’’, ‘‘togetherness’’, ‘‘collocation’’, etc. The
abundance of labels does not reflect an abundance of different analysis of what
this relation is; rather, the compresence relation is usually taken as unanalyzable and
ontologically primitive. It is thus defined and individuated not by its nature or
intrinsic features of which we are not told much by BTT, but rather by its theoretical
role: it is a unifying device,1 a device that takes properties to make up objects.
Compare this to STT (and see how easy it is for me to write an almost exact
paraphrase of the preceding paragraph here). To make up objects, STT uses
properties and a bearer of properties that goes around under different names like
‘‘substratum’’ (the term that I will be using), ‘‘naked particular’’, ‘‘bare particular’’,
‘‘thin particular’’, ‘‘substance’’ (but be careful about this one), etc. The abundance of
labels does not reflect an abundance of different analysis of what this bearer is;
rather, the substratum is usually taken as unanalyzable and ontologically primitive.
It is thus defined and individuated not by its nature or intrinsic features of which we
are not told much by STT, but rather by its theoretical role: it is a unifying device, a
device that takes properties to make objects.
Both BTT and STT thus have a unifying device, a primitive and under-defined
one, an entity whose purpose is to tie or glue together properties of a single object.
Paraphrasing Locke, in both cases this unifying device is a ‘‘we-know-not-what’’ ...
but it is a ‘‘we-know-what-it-does’’, that is, we know its theoretical role.2
1 One could also say ’tying device’ or ’object-making device’.
2 Compare to what Peter Simons puts as an objection to BTT (my italics): ‘‘One possibility is that
compresence is neither a binary (gluing two tropes) nor a ternary (gluing two tropes and a place) relation
but one with many more terms, as many as there are tropes in the bundle. We may not know what arity
this relation has—it might even be infinite—and there might be different arities for different types of
concrete independent particular, but there will be such a relation nevertheless. A big drawback this has is
that it is hard to see what explanatory force this has. All we are saying is that a bundle of tropes is held
together by whatever relation holds it together. This is really giving up.’’ (Simons 1994, p. 371)
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One often asks, as an objection to STT: ‘‘In virtue of what is a substratum distinct
from another substratum? No attributes or properties can distinguish between
them!’’. But the very same question can be asked about compresence: ‘‘Tu quoque:
In virtue of what is one compresence relation (involved in the bundling of an object
A) distinct from another (involved in the bundling of another object B)? No
attributes or properties can distinguish between them.’’ Both views answer these
questions by a primitivist claim.
It is by reflecting on the preceding that it struck me for the first time that I
actually don’t really see the difference between BTT and STT. But of course much
more needs to be done in order to even start to justify any kind of equivalence claim
between the two views. I shall do this by first examining a possible difference in the
status of the unifying device in BTT and STT (and see that there isn’t any), and then
by examining some objections to STT and BTT where the unifying device plays a
crucial role, and argue for a tu quoque in all cases.
4 The status of the unifying device
A possible difference between BTT and STT could be that compresence is just one
among other elements of the bundle (just one among the properties of an object),
while a substratum has to be considered apart from the properties it bears. So
compresence and the substratum don’t have the same status, they do not play the
same theoretical role in the composition of an object.
But this is not true, as Ehring (2001) shows: The properties included in a bundle are
compresent. The compresence relation, however, is not a member of the bundle like
the other properties and relations because if we included compresence in the bundle,
then it would itself have to be compresent with the other properties: compresence
compresent with F, G, H, ... But that either makes no sense or leads to an infinite
regress. And what it shows is that compresence, exactly as the substratum, has to be
considered apart from the other properties of the object; its status as a unifying device
is thus different from the other properties and is the same in BTT and STT.
5 The objection from change
Let us now consider a first of two classic objections to BTT, and examine how STT
allegedly avoids them by appealing to a substratum.
This first objection can be found, for instance, in Van Cleve (1985, p. 122): ‘‘If a
thing were a set of properties, it would be incapable of change. For a thing could
change its properties only if the set identical with it could change its members, but
that is impossible; no set can change its members.’’ Taking an example of an
individual that is supposed to change one of its properties over time, he adds: ‘‘[...]
what we have is replacement of one individual by another, not change in the
properties of one and the same individual.’’ (Van Cleve 1985, p. 124).
The idea here is simple, and quite compelling: if an individual is identified with a
bundle of properties, then if one of the properties changes, the bundle is not the
same, and so, the individual who is the bundle is not the same—it simply ceased to
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exist, while another individual has taken its place. So, according to BTT, nothing
can undergo change in properties.
How does STT avoid this objection? It doesn’t! There is no more genuine change
in STT than in BTT: the substratum (the thin particular) does obviously not change
(since it is propertyless, it cannot undergo qualitative change), and the thick
particular (the substratum + the properties it bears) does not change either for exactly
the same reason as in the case of BTT. There is no change, but there is replacement of
one thick particular by another: take a thick particular at t1 and at a later time t2 when
it went through some qualitative change, it simply is something different.
Of course, the STT theorist will object: ‘‘I have something that you, BTT, don’t
have: a substratum that remains the same over different times, and this guarantees
me that the individual, while changing its properties, is the same individual.’’
But if this were an acceptable reply here, then BTT has at hand exactly the same:
‘‘I have a compresence relation that remains the same over different times, and this
guarantees me that the individual, while changing its properties, is the same
individual. You have your primitive unifying device that does the job, I have mine.’’
So it seems that both views can handle the objection in the same way by
appealing to the unifying device, and that calling the device different names
(‘‘compresence’’ or ‘‘substratum’’) does not change anything since both unifying
devices just play the same role in the same way. To be more precise about this, let us
examine the two main strategies there are to face the problem of persistence through
time, namely a version of perdurantism and a version of endurantism, and see
whether there is any difference between the use of a substratum or the compresence
relation. (There isn’t.)
6 The perdurantist version
A traditional version of perdurantism (the 4D worm view) for BTT is a bundle-
bundle theory. Think again of my neighbour Cyrano, as a case of an object changing
in intrinsic properties over time: Cyrano has, at t1, a big nose but undergoes plastic
surgery, and has at a later time t2 a small nose.
Cyrano
t1 t2
According to perdurantism, Cyrano is an aggregate of his temporal parts, that are
numerically and qualitatively distinct objects. The perdurantist account of change
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thus claims that Cyrano changes over time by having different temporal parts at
different times. In terms of BTT, this picture looks as follows (where ‘‘C’’ stands for
‘‘compresence’’):
F, G, H 
t1-part 
Cyrano
C
F, G, K 
t2-part 
C
………..
t3-part 
C
Cyrano is here simply a bundle of momentary bundles of properties (a bundle of
bundles). Now, what about a perdurantist version of STT? It does not look any
different from BTT-like perdurantism, except that I had to change ‘‘C’’ into ‘‘S’’ (for
‘‘substratum’’):
F, G, H 
t1-part 
Cyrano
S
F, G, K 
t2-part 
S
………..
t3-part 
S
So I would like to suggest that it seems that the only difference we have here is
terminological: in both cases, there is a unifying device included in the momentary
temporal parts of Cyrano, and saying that in one case it’s compresence and that in
the other case it’s a substratum does not make any difference in the way this
unifying device achieves to play its theoretical role. Let us now have a look at the
endurantist alternative.
7 The endurantist version
Endurantism is the view that Cyrano persists through time and through intrinsic
change by existing wholly at different times, rather than by having temporal parts.
For the endurantist, one and the same (numerically identical) person exists wholly at
t1 and t2 and has the two incompatible properties of having a big nose and having a
small nose. In order to avoid the threat of having to deal with a contradiction,
endurantists will typically embrace some kind of temporal indexation strategy and it
is the standard version with time-indexed properties that I will be using here.3
According to this view (indexicalism), Cyrano does not have incompatible
properties, for instead of having properties like ‘‘having a big nose’’ he has time-
indexed properties like ‘‘having-a-big-nose-at-t1’’ and ‘‘having-a-small-nose-at-t2’’,
and these are perfectly well compatible and non-contradictory. Thus, since the
3 I’ll talk about adverbialism in Sect. 11.
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indexicalist will claim that all properties are always indexed, no contradiction can
ever arise from intrinsic change of an object that is numerically one and the same at
different times, as the endurantist claims.
Now, the BTT figure one is tempted to draw here is the following (as before, ‘‘C’’
is the compresence relation that ties together the different properties of the bundle):
F-at-t1
G-at-t1
F-at-t2
  K-at-t2 
…
Cyrano
t1 t2
Cyrano Cyrano
t3
C
F-at-t1
G-at-t1
F-at-t2
  K-at-t2 
…
C
F-at-t1
G-at-t1
F-at-t2
  K-at-t2 
…
C
But this is a bad picture. It is not the picture the endurantist should be drawing.
First, why draw three times the same thing? These three bundles of properties are not
three bundles located at three different temporal locations, rather they are one and the
same. Drawing the same thing three times is here totally redundant and unhelpful.
Second, the time-axis is also redundant—we do not need it in order to know what is
happening to Cyrano at different times, since all temporal specifications are already
included in the properties of which Cyrano is a bundle. So, after removing all of the
redundant and confusing elements, here is the correct endurantist picture:
F-at-t1
G-at-t1
F-at-t2
  K-at-t2 
…
Cyrano
C
Cyrano is simply a bundle of time-indexed properties. If you find this strange and
surprising ... you really shouldn’t. If you find it strange and surprising, it’s perhaps
just that you are accustomed to thinking in terms of perdurantism-inspired pictures.
But I hope that you don’t find this strange, and surprising—after all, this is exactly
the endurantist picture Peter Van Inwagen draws (see Van Inwagen 1985, p. 195),
except that he does not do it in terms of the bundle theory.
And again, with no surprise, the STT endurantist picture looks just like the
preceding one:
F-at-t1
G-at-t1
F-at-t2
  K-at-t2 
…
Cyrano
S
The upshot of all the above considerations is, again, simply the following: the
substratum and the compresence relation play the same theoretical role. Thus,
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because both BTT and STT use their unifying device in the same way, they have
exactly the same means to face the objection in a parallel way and it seems that the
difference between them is merely terminological—one has a unifying device called
‘‘C’’ and the other has a device called ‘‘S’’ but since both devices are theoretical
entities (they are there to do some theoretical work) and are thus individuated by
their theoretical role, and since they play their theoretical role in the same way, they
just seem to be one and the same thing under different disguises. And if that’s the
case, there just does not seem to be any real difference between BTT and STT.
8 The modal objection
I shall now more quickly go through the second of the two classic objections to
BTT, which is the modal analogue of the first, and is structurally similar to it. Take
Cyrano, who is a bundle of bundles of properties (or a bundle of time-indexed
properties, if you prefer the endurantist approach). Now, the objector remarks, as
before, that the identity of bundles depends on their constituents—a bundle must
have the constituents it has, otherwise it would not be the same bundle. So, it seems
that the components of a bundle are essential to it. But then, the bundle theorist
faces the unwelcome consequence of his theory that any property of any individual
turns out to be a necessary property of it. Take, again, Cyrano who has a big nose. In
the bundle theorist’s vocabulary, what we have is a bundle of bundles of properties,
among which is the property of having a big nose. But, since Cyrano is this bundle,
and since bundles have their components essentially, it is impossible for Cyrano to
have had any other properties than he actually has—even the most insignificant and
contingent ones, like the size of his nose, or the amount of hair he had this morning
at 7 A.M. If this is true, bundle theory certainly does not look very appealing.
How does STT avoid this objection? It doesn’t! The bare substratum cannot have
different properties than the ones it actually has, since in itself it doesn’t have any,
and the thick particular (the substratum + the properties it bears) cannot have
different properties either, for exactly the same reason that the BTT theorist’s
bundle cannot have different properties. If what individuates the particular Cyrano
is only the substratum (which would be a strange view anyway) then it has all of its
properties essentially, since it doesn’t have any, and if what individuates Cyrano is
the substratum and its properties, then if you take one property away you don’t have
the same particular anymore, exactly as in the case of BTT.
Of course, the STT theorist, as before, will object: ‘‘I have something that you,
BTT, don’t have: a substratum that allows me to have a particular with different
properties because it will still make it the same particular even if some properties
change’’.
But if this were an acceptable reply here, then BTT has at hand exactly the same:
‘‘I have a compresence relation that remains the same even if it were to bundle
different properties, and this guarantees me that the particular, while having
different properties, is the same particular. You have your primitive unifying device
that does the job, I have mine.’’
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As before, it seems that both views can handle the objection in the same way by
appealing to the unifying device, and that calling the device different names
(‘‘compresence’’ or ‘‘substratum’’) does not change anything since both unifying
devices just play the same role in the same way. To be more precise, exactly as in
the temporal case in the preceding section, both views have in the modal case the
possibility to pick their favourite view on persistence across possible worlds (trans-
world identity, counterpart theory, modal perdurants, ...) and use it to answer the
objection. And as before, my point here is not to defend BTT against objections, but
to show that whatever means STT has to avoid them can be also equally well used
by BTT, simply because both views have a unifying device which just seems to be
one and the same thing.
9 The equivalence claim
The argument for this latter claim, that I already introduced at the end of the
preceding section, was the following:
A. BTT and STT are equivalent
because
B. the unifying device called ‘‘substratum’’ in STT and the unifying device called
‘‘compresence’’ in BTT are identical (metaphysical equivalence)
because
C. they play the same theoretical role in the same way
and
D. they are theoretical entities (that is, they are individuated by their theoretical
role).
But perhaps some will not be comfortable with (D) because they will feel that the
substratum and the compresence relation, even though they do the same theoretical
work, are not ‘just’ theoretical entities but really are metaphysically different things
(I ask those (not rhetorically, but with genuine interest) to show why and how they
believe this to be the case). Or perhaps some will not be happy with (C) and (D)
being enough to justify (B), and consequently to justify (A), because they believe
that playing the same theoretical role is not enough to justify that there is a
metaphysical equivalence. Depending on how one takes these worries, one might be
tempted to accept one or the other of the following conclusions:
• Strong Conclusion:
Thesis: BTT and STT are metaphysically equivalent.
Argument: C and S are theoretical entities, which means that they are
individuated by their theoretical role. Since the theoretical role they play is
the same, they are the same theoretical entity.
• Weak Conclusion:
Thesis: it is epistemically under-determined which one of BTT or STT we
should choose.
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Argument: C and S are metaphysically different entities, but they play the
same theoretical role in the same way, and STT and BTT have the same
explanatory power (as far as we metaphysicians are concerned, they both do
the job we want them to do).
I myself am strongly tempted to endorse the Strong Conclusion, following the
(A)–(D) argument above, but since I am not sure how to rule out the Weak
Conclusion, I prudentially prefer to limit myself to this weaker claim.
10 Versions with universals
It is time now to examine the top line of my table from Sect. 2 and compare the
Bundle Theory with Universals (BTU) and the Substratum Theory with Universals
(STU). As already mentioned, in this table, (3) is ruled out for exactly the same
reason (1a) was: not all objects have the same number of properties, and so if one
wants to have one and the same relation to be the bundling relation for all objects
(which is here plausible since we are friends of universals) something like a variably
polyadic relation (like ‘‘x, y, z, ... are compresent with one another’’) is required.
But before, let’s have a closer look at (4) where different universals play the role
of the bundling relation for different objects; one universal per object. With respect
to the two objections we have seen in the case of BTT and STT, the situation is here
the same, and the same equivalence conclusion can be drawn. But there is another
traditional objection to the bundle theory with universals that will perhaps make a
difference between BTU and STU: the objection from the principle of Identity of
Indiscernibles. Let us see how the objection goes.
BTU suffers from a traditionally weighty objection: it is committed to the
principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. But this principle is false.4 So, BTU is false.
½Id.Ind. ð8xÞ ð8yÞ ðð8FÞ ðFx $ FyÞ ! ðx ¼ yÞÞ
Under BTU, material objects are said to be bundles of properties. Now, take two
objects that have the same properties, for instance, as in Max Black’s world, two
perfect spheres of the same size, same mass, same composition, same colour, and so
on. Both spheres are bundles of the same properties (universals5)—and so are the
same bundles. But then, the bundle theorist must accept that the two spheres are
numerically identical—that is, there is only one sphere. And this is exactly what the
principle of Identity of Indiscernibles claims.
But this principle is false, for it is quite possible there to be two numerically distinct
objects that have exactly the same properties (that are qualitative duplicates). The
example of two spheres exactly alike in all of their properties is possible.
How can BTU get out of this trouble? Distinguishing between the two bundles by
the use of spatio-temporal location properties (‘‘being on the left of Cyrano’’) or by
the use of haecceistic properties (‘‘being identical to sphere A’’) has not proven to be
4 Or only contingently true.
5 Of course, BTT does not suffer from this objection.
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a very appealing strategy in the abundant literature on this subject. But, for my
present purposes, it is not the time now to examine these possible answers to the
objection, rather what I wish to ask myself now is: how does STU face it? Or rather:
why does this objection not even arise against STU? The answer is obvious and
readily at hand: the two spheres are distinguished not by their properties (they are
qualitative duplicates), but by what bears them, that is, the substrata that ‘unify’
them and put them together in order to make up an object. The substrata being
numerically distinct, the two spheres are numerically distinct as well.
But what grounds the claim that the two substrata are numerically distinct? It
cannot be a qualitative difference between them, so what is it? As we have already
seen, there is not much of a choice, and so substratum theorists simply claim that the
numerical difference between two substrata is a primitive fact. (Very well, any
theory has its primitives.) But, as before, BTU can use exactly the same strategy—
remember that here we have different compresence relations, one per object, and so
two objects, even qualitatively identical, will always be numerically distinct since
the bundling relation that ties together their properties will be a different
universal—exactly as in the case of STU it will be a numerically different
substratum. But then, as a tu quoque, one can ask: In virtue of what is a given
compresence relation numerically distinct from another compresence relation? And
there is no better answer to this question than to the same question about distinct
substrata, the only option is primitive distinctness.6
But then, again, it seems that the thing that plays the role of a unifying device in
STU (the substratum) and the thing that plays the role of a unifying device in BTU
(the compresence relation) are both equally well suited to do the job: once we are
ready to accept as a suitable way to avoid the objection from Id.Ind. that there is
primitive numerical difference between substrata, why not as happily answer the
objection by saying that there is primitive numerical difference between two
compresence relations? After all, bundle theorists often speak about the compres-
ence relation as of a primitive that is as under-defined and under-explained as a
substratum is, so why not let it do the job for which it seems so naturally suited? So,
as in the case of BTT and STT, the two theories here do have the same means to
avoid any worries with Id.Ind., both contain a ‘unifying device’ that allows them to
do so in the same way, and calling this device different names (substratum versus
compresence relation) does not make a difference other than merely terminological.
Stick to a neutral vocabulary (like ‘‘unifying device’’) and reformulate the two
views, with respect to the Id.Ind. objection: both will be able to say that sphere A
and sphere B can be distinguished by there being a primitively distinguished
unifying device for A and for B. So, as before, a Strong Conclusion and a Weak
Conclusion can be alternatively drawn in the case of BTU and STU.
Note: In the same manner, BTU can avoid other objections that ultimately rest on
the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, like ‘‘the problem of angels’’ (Hawthorne
and Cover 1998, p. 216) or ‘‘the problem with circular time and circular space’’
6 The perhaps tempting idea to distinguish non-primitively between the compresence relations precisely
by the number of properties they relate is unappealing because some distinct objects do have the same
number of properties. (For instance two objects that are qualitative duplicates except for their colour.)
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(Hawthorne and Cover 1998, p. 218)—indeed, these objections actually are ‘just’
different cases that exhibit the problem with identical indiscernibles in different
ways. But of course, Hawthorne and Cover use a different version of BTU—the one
that I shall examine in the following section.
11 Enemies after all?
In the remaining section of the paper, I will now consider places where the bundle
theory and the substratum theory are not equivalent, and show that the reason why
these versions are not equivalent is also the reason why they are much less
appealing.7
A first such place is the last case (5) in my table from Sect. 2 above: BTU where
the compresence relation is one and the same numerically identical variably polyadic
universal that plays the role of the bundling relation for all objects (let’s call it
‘‘BTU2’’). This feature makes BTU2 more vulnerable to the objection from Id.Ind.
and makes it a different, non-equivalent, view than STU (and than the version of
BTU examined in the preceding section (let’s call this one BTU1)). It is easy to see
how and why: since BTU2’s unifying device is one and the same for all objects
(rather than one per object as in STU or BTU1), it is no wonder that we have troubles
here with the identity of indiscernible objects, since the (allegedly) two indiscernible
objects not only share all of their qualitative properties (universals) but they even
share what makes them to be an object, they even share one and the very same
unifying device! From this point of view, it is really not hard to see why worries arise
about the claim that they are two, rather than one, in the first place! So, I dare say,
what makes BTU2 a different view from the others is also its main weakness.
Hawthorne defends BTU2 against this worry in his Hawthorne (1995), and his
defence is as ingenious as it is simple: since, according to BTU2, objects are bundles
of universals, they can behave like universals; relevantly, a bundle of universals (for
instance the bundle that is a sphere in Black’s world) can be, exactly as a single
universal can be, bi-instantiated, and bi-located. Black’s world can be thus re-
described in terms of BTU2 as a world where there is one sphere bi-located at a
distance from itself. (And this is strange, Hawthorne claims, only to the extent that
the idea of a bi-located universal is perhaps strange.)
A consequence of this is that material objects, like a sphere or Cyrano or
yourself, behave like universals. So such a view really seems to collapse the
distinction between objects and properties—indeed, it seems that objects are simply
eliminated from ontology. This is, in short, a worry put forward by Vallicella
(1997). But it is hard to evaluate the dialectic force of this worry, since the BTU2
theorist could very well simply bite the bullet, without perhaps too much harm. But
7 Another such place, I believe (but without arguing for it in this paper), is a bundle-theoretic-like view
called the ‘‘nuclear theory’’, defended by Simons (1994) and based on Husserl’s view. This view does not
fit in my table from Sect. 2, indeed, it has a different structure than ’standard’ bundle and substratum
theories since, as Simons himself says, ‘‘it combines aspects of both bundle theory and substratum
theory’’. I believe that precisely because of its unusual structure the view is unappealing, but I do not offer
any arguments to support that belief here.
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Vallicella offers a second objection that seems to me more damaging, while being
simpler: to be multiply located, a bundle of universals would have to be instantiated,
but this makes no sense for BTU2. Here is an almost exact quote from Vallicella
(1997, p. 94) that I have only slightly modified in order to stick to my terminology
in this paper:
A universal U is (multiply) located if and only if it is (multiply) instantiated.
So if a bundle B of universals is itself a universal then it is (multiply) located if
and only if it is (multiply) instantiated. But what could account for B’s
(multiple) instantiation? On BTU2, universals are instantiated by being
bundled together with other universals. But it makes no sense to suppose that
B is bundled together with other universals; for B is a complete bundle of
universals. [...] But if B is not bundled together with other universals, then it is
not instantiated. For on BTU2, a universal is instantiated just in case it enters
into a bundle. And if B is not instantiated, then it cannot be multiply
instantiated. But if B cannot be multiply instantiated, it cannot be multiply
located. So Black’s world cannot be given Hawthorne’s reading: it cannot be
construed as a single sphere at a non-zero distance from itself. For the sphere
cannot be doubly located without being doubly instantiated, and it cannot be
instantiated at all, for the simple reason that a bundle of universals is not a
universal but a particular, and no particular can be instantiated.
It is not my purpose here to try to refute BTU2, even though I share Vallicella’s
worries. My point, as already mentioned, is simply to see that the reason why BTU2
is a non-equivalent view, different from BTU1 and STU, is also the reason why it is
in trouble, where its competitors are on safe waters.
To make my case stronger, let me note another point of dissatisfaction with BTU2
and the way it can handle persistence through time. Let us first suppose that our
BTU2 theorist is an endurantist. Remember the objection to endurantism from
temporary intrinsics, and take again my neighbour Cyrano and say that at time t1 he
has a big nose, but he then decides to undergo plastic surgery (for expository reasons
a bit later than before, say at t5) and consequently has a small nose at a later time t6.
For the endurantist, this means that one and the same (numerically identical) person
exists wholly at t1 and t6 and has the two incompatible properties of having a big nose
and having a small nose. As we have seen, to avoid a contradiction, the endurantist
appeals here to an indexicalist strategy and so this is how the view looked like:
F-at-t1
G-at-t1
F-at-t2
  K-at-t2 
…
Cyrano
C
Now, my worry is the following. At t1, Cyrano has a big nose. At t2, he has a big
nose. At t3, he still has a big nose. And so on, until the surgery. The intuitive thing to
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say here is clearly that Cyrano keeps having a certain property for a certain time—
but the indexicalist endurantist just cannot allow for that. According to
indexicalism, at any time during the interval t1–t4, Cyrano has to lose all of his
properties and gain new ones: he first has the property ‘‘having-a-big-nose-at-t1’’,
then the property ‘‘having-a-big-nose-at-t2’’, then the property ‘‘having-a-big-nose-
at-t3’’, and so on. According to this view, because Cyrano cannot simply
(simpliciter) have the property of having a big nose, he has to change his
properties all the time, and he cannot keep any—he just cannot stay the same. And
since the property ‘‘having a big nose’’ is not available to her, the endurantist does
not have the theoretical means to say that all these time-indexed properties have
‘something in common’—they just are different properties.
But rather than objecting to endurantism, my point here is that time-indexed
properties are tropes. In the indexicalist’s world there is no room for a single
property to be multiply instantiated, since any property is time-bound and cannot be
instantiated at different times, and so there simply is no room for universals
(multiply instantiable properties).
And of course, not only properties have to be time-bound but space-time-bound.
The need for this is most salient in the case of a time-travel scenario. Suppose that at
t6 Cyrano travels back to the past in order to tell his former self that the surgery will
be all right and that he does not have to worry. According to endurantism, Cyrano
then has the properties ‘‘having-a-big-nose-at-t1’’ and ‘‘having-a-small-nose-at-t1’’:
a seeming contradiction, easily solved by claiming that all properties are always
space-time-bound, since of course ‘‘having-a-big-nose-at-l1-t1’’ and ‘‘having-a-big-
nose-at-l2-t1’’ are not contradictory (where ‘‘l’’ stands of course for ‘‘spatial
location’’).8
So: the endurantist has to do something in order to avoid the Lewisian worry
about temporary intrinsics, and if what she does there is to embrace indexicalism,
her properties just have to be space-time bound and non-multiply instantiated—
tropes. So it seems that this is not an option the BTU2 theorist can choose.
But perhaps she has other options—she can either choose (to try) to be a
perdurantist or (to try) to remain an endurantist but abandon indexicalism in favour
of adverbialism. Let us examine these two options in turn.
Perdurantism just does not seem to be available to the BTU2 theorist either. At
the very least, it would be very strange for her to take that route since her central
claim is that objects behave like universals and can be multiply located, while the
perdurantist’s central claim is that all objects are space-time bound and that nothing
(no object) can be multiply located. So even if perdurantism does not force one to
embrace tropes (unlike indexicalist endurantism), it does not seem to be a viable
option for the friend of BTU2.
The last option is endurantist adverbialism. Or is it? Indeed, we will now easily
see that adverbialism is available only to the substratum theorist, and not to the
bundle theorist and so this strategy cannot be of any help to BTU2 either.
The adverbialist solution to the problem of temporary intrinsic properties
proposes not to temporally modify the property but the having of it. Thus the
8 I am not saying that this solves all problems the endurantist might have with time travel.
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adverbialist will say that ‘‘Cyrano has a big nose at t1’’ is to be analyzed as ‘‘Cyrano
has-at-t1 a big nose’’ or, more elegantly, ‘‘Cyrano has t1-ly a big nose’’ (see Johnston
1987, p. 129). So, according to adverbialism, there is not just the having of a
property, there is always t-ly having (or having-at-t) of a property. This will provide
a solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics, because Cyrano has a big nose at
t1 and has a small nose at t2, and so he has both the incompatible properties, but it
has the former t1-ly and the latter t2-ly and this is how the threat of a contradiction is
avoided.
Now, in order to be able to be an adverbialist, the substratum theorist could want
to say that there is a third component in her view—a relation of exemplification
between the substratum and its properties—and that this relation is time-indexed
(rather than the properties being time-indexed, as the endurantist indexicalist would
have it). The endurantist-adverbialist-substratist picture then looks like this (where
‘‘S’’ stands for ‘‘substratum’’):
F
G
F
K 
Cyrano
S
-ly
-ly
t2
t1
t1
-ly 
t2-ly 
The bundle theorist, obviously, cannot (and does not want to) provide anything
like this, since she does not introduce a substratum that needs to be related by a
special relation to its properties; her view does not require any such
intermediaries—and so, she cannot be an adverbialist since there is no suitable
place where to put the adverbialist index,9 and so BTU2 simply cannot appeal to this
strategy. To sum up:
First, BTU2 is not compatible with endurantist indexicalism because this view
requires tropes rather than universals; it does not, at least prima facie, look like it
could be made to work under perdurantism; and endurantist adverbialism simply is
not an available option. Add to this Vallicella’s worries, and it really seems that
BTU2 is a non-equivalent view to the others only because of features that make it
ultimately very hard to sound appealing.
Second, there is another place where the bundle theory and the substratum theory
are not equivalent: only the substratum theory is compatible with adverbialist
endurantism. But: this is true only for a certain version of the substratum theory,
namely a version that insists on there really being a third component in the theory, a
(time-indexed) relation between the substratum and its properties. And even
substratum theorists themselves often agree that this is a bad version of their view
(among other reasons, because of Bradley-like regresses and related issues). Most
recently, Sider (2006) in his defence of substrata insists that the relation of
9 Indexing the relation of compresence would make it a perdurantist view.
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exemplification should not be put too much weight on, and it is often claimed that
exemplification is not a relation, that it is a ‘‘non-relational tie’’, that we shouldn’t
reify exemplification (Lewis 1983, p. 351–355). I guess that the idea here is to build
already into the substratum the theoretical function to be able to simply stick to its
properties in addition to its function of being a unifier (exactly as compresence!),
rather than only taking it as a unifier that requires a further theoretical device in
order to account for the nature of objects. And only if one takes the latter (much less
palatable) option, one will get a different view than the bundle theory (and here
again, the reason why it is different is also the reason why it is unpalatable).
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